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INTRODUCTION 
Research has demonstrated that creative industries are built on a “good ol’ boys 
network” where knowing the right people is key in obtaining employment (Bielby and 
Bielby 1994; Faulkner and Anderson 1987).  But how do new artists with limited social 
network connections break into a field?  Jerry Weintraub, a concert promoter and John 
Denver’s talent manager, suggests in his autobiography that the secret to promoting an 
emerging act is to “sell [them] in the past tense” (2010:123).  He divulges in his 
memoires that John Denver was launched into stardom by being sold “as if he were 
already a star.”  Weintraub marketed Denver as an established artist using several tactics 
including producing a Greatest Hits album after Denver’s first hit, “Take Me Home, 
Country Roads.”  According to Weintraub’s philosophy, emerging artists achieve success 
if they are presented as maintaining their status rather than achieving it.  In this article I 
utilize Weintraub’s marketing philosophy as I seek to understand how emerging artists 
display themselves as having directive power authority to make and enforce demands 
made in their employment contracts.   
I investigate contract riders as material representations of the interpersonal 
communication between concert promoters and artists wherein an artist signals 
qualifications of professionalism and alignment with values and belief structures 
characteristic of a touring musician’s profession. Through a quantitative content analysis 
of 30 production riders I develop a typology of signaling strategies used by artists to 
signal adherence to norms, values, and beliefs in an effort to justify their power to make 
and enforce demands in their riders.  Through this analysis I am able to begin to explain 
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the role of signaling professionalism in achieving status and power in employment 
negotiations.  
The purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical model that integrates 
literatures from sociology, law, and organizational theory to illuminate the process of 
achieving legitimacy and its influence on careers in creative industries.  I identify 
strategies used by artists to justify employment qualifications in contract negotiations and 
measure variation in the type and usage of signaling strategies by career stage and genre.  
The legitimation of an artist’s status is crucial for sustaining employment in the arts as 
“art world success…[is] equated with the attainment of legitimacy” (Baumann 2007:51).  
An artist’s legitimacy correlates with their ability to invoke directive power to enforce 
requests made in their rider.  
I begin with a discussion of the signaled qualifications required for artists to 
enhance their project opportunities and matches.  The next section of the article addresses 
the process by which artists are matched to contractors through signaled qualifications.  
In the next section of the article, I outline the process of legitimation and its application it 
to the case of artist contract riders.  I follow this with a discussion with an application of 
the model to a sample of contract riders.  Finally I offer conclusions and directions for 
future research.  
QUALIFICATIONS FOR ARTISTIC EMPLOYMENT 
In explaining why some artists succeed while a large majority fails, scholars 
consider two types of candidate qualifications: formal and informal.  Formal 
qualifications are those present in an artist’s resume such as work histories, skill sets, 
awards, critical acclaim, and past project revenues (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby 
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and Bielby 1999; Pinheiro and Dowd 2009).  Defillippi and Arthur (1994) have labeled 
these types of qualifications as “knowing-how” career competencies which are evaluated 
in employment decisions in firms using project-based employment structures.  These 
formal qualifications signal to a potential contractor that the candidate possesses the 
requisite competencies in job-related skills and has the potential to increase a project’s 
profits (Jones 2002: 213-214).  Several longitudinal studies of artistic labor have 
demonstrated that career success is a function of these formal qualifications.  Studies 
have found the strongest predictor of future employment in the arts is a history of 
associations with successful projects (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 
1999).   
In further analyzing such formal qualifications for employment in the arts 
scholars have examined the relationship between economic success and the accumulation 
of a diverse set of skills including technical know-how and the ability to work across 
multiple genres.  These scholars have found that artists who demonstrate formal 
qualifications through a display of their “knowing-how” competencies across a broad 
range of artistic skills increase their desirability and therefore open up more opportunities 
for employment (Pinheiro and Dowd 2009; Bechky 2006; Zuckerman 2005; Faulkner 
2003).   
A surplus of formally qualified workers in the artistic labor market exists because 
a large number of artists have training in technical and aesthetic skills (Menger 1999).  
Creating a successful career in the arts is complicated by the concentration of rewards 
among a small percentage of practitioners, and almost immediate failure for the rest 
(Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Menger 1999).  The skewed distribution of rewards is 
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produced, in part, by the fact that contractors rely on an artist’s informal qualifications— 
components of an artist’s candidacy that cannot be found on a resume—as proxy 
measures of a candidate’s fit with a project (Menger 1999; Bechky 2006; Bielby and 
Bielby 1994, 1999; Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Zafirau 2008; Zwaan, ter Bogt, and 
Raaijmakers 2010; Neff, Wissinger, and Zukin 2005).  
One site scholars look to in measuring the role of informal qualifications in the 
hiring process is an artist’s “knowing-whom” competencies—information about a 
candidate provided though social networks (Defillippi and Arthur 1994; Faulkner and 
Anderson 1987; Jones 1996, 2002; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997; Zafirau 2008).  
An artist’s knowing-whom competencies are referred to as reputation—third party 
information about an artist’s “character, skills, reliability, and other attributes important 
to exchanges” (Jones et al. 1997:932).  Artists leverage their contacts for 
recommendations and referrals in seeking employment. An artist obtains a so-called 
“stamp of approval” through affiliation with well-connected individuals who refer them 
to jobs.   Formal characteristics of an artist’s social network including its size and 
embeddedness also matter in explaining career outcomes for artists.  Studies show a 
strong positive correlation between the size of an artist’s professional network and both 
economic and critical success (Zwaan et al. 2010; Zuckerman 2005; Faulkner 2003).  
These studies demonstrate how social capital, in the form of one’s reputation, is 
translated into economic capital in project-based industries (Becker 1982; Craig and 
Dubois 2010).   
Furthermore, the informal qualification of “knowing-whom” has compounding 
effects with the formal qualification of “knowing-how.”  Experienced artists who have 
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broad reaching and well-connected networks are more frequently hired, while artists 
without these networks face frequent spells of unemployment (Menger 1999; Bechky 
2006).  Faulkner and Anderson (1987) find evidence of the compounding effect of 
knowing-whom and knowing-how in their study of film industry workers wherein they 
discover that those artists with the most extensive work histories and skill sets are 
structurally embedded in the same social networks.  Together, these artists repeatedly 
work on projects over the course of their careers.  This yields a skewed distribution of 
rewards where success is concentrated among a select group of highly skilled, 
interconnected artists.  As artists advance in their careers and become further connected 
in highly successful networks they rely more heavily on their work histories with well-
established network individuals to obtain employment (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; 
Bielby and Bielby 1999).  
While studies of formal qualifications and informal qualifications measured 
through an artist’s social networks account for a portion of employment decisions in 
project-based labor markets, scholars have argued that “knowing-why” career 
competencies also play a factor in hiring decisions (Defillippi and Arthur 1994; Jones 
2002) .  Knowing-why career competencies are information about a worker’s individual 
beliefs, values, identities, and practices (Defillippi and Arthur 1994).  Scholars have 
suggested that the interpersonal communication between contractors and artists is a  site 
for the presentation of the following knowing-why informal qualifications:  artistic 
interests and identity (Defillippi and Arthur 1994; Jones 2002), professional attitudes and 
business skills (Zwaan, ter Bogt, and Raaijmakers 2009; Zwaan et al. 2010), and the 
adoption and performance of institutionalized norms and conventions (Zafirau 2008).    
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Vertically integrated organizations attempt to align workers’ knowing-why 
qualifications with the organization’s values, beliefs, and practices through a process of 
professional socialization (Feldman 1989; Fiol 1991; Barney 1986).  However, in project-
based industries an employee’s values, beliefs, and practices are decoupled from the 
firm’s (Parker 2002; Defillippi and Arthur 1994).   For workers in creative industries 
professional socialization occurs across projects as workers develop a collective 
understanding of the institutionalized norms, practices, values and beleifs of their 
profession (Bechky 2006).  Workers display adherence to professional norms, values and 
beliefs through signals of knowing-why career competencies in exchanges with potential 
contractors (Defillippi and Arthur 1994).    
Preliminary work has been done to measure the role of knowing-why 
competencies on career outcomes.   In their study of emerging Dutch pop musicians, 
Zwaan et al. (2010) find the odds of success increase for musicians with stronger self-
reported professional attitudes.  Additionally, Zafirau (2008) has studied how 
professional norms—“the intentional activities that participants perform in order to create 
the perception that they are legitimate, according to institutionalized expectations” 
(101)—are practiced by agents in a Hollywood talent agency.  Such studies reveal 
evidence of the processes by which a worker’s knowing-why qualifications factor into 
employment in creative industries.  These theories and findings are expanded upon in this 
paper as I develop a model for the analysis of signals of knowing-why career 
competencies in the interpersonal communication between artists and contractors 
negotiating employment conditions.  I seek to explain how artists with varying amounts 
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of formal and informal qualifications signal adherence to professional norms, values, and 
belief structures—capacities of their knowing-why qualifications.    
MATCHING ARTIST AND CONTRACTOR QUALIFICATIONS 
Projects in culture industries involve a matching process where artists and 
contractors are matched with one another based on knowing-how, knowing-whom, and 
knowing-why qualifications (Jones 2002).   Artists are constrained to various 
performance outlets based on genre, size and construction of the show, and characteristics 
of their fan base.  These needs are aligned with an artist’s knowing-how formal career 
competencies.  Accordingly, artists must be matched with promoters who have the ability 
to fulfill these needs.  Like artists, promoters are also situated in market niches, 
specializing in the number and size of shows they promote (e.g., local versus national 
tour promoters), physical constraints of the venues they subcontract with (e.g., size 
limitations and building codes), and genres they specialize in promoting.  In addition to 
the matching of artists’ and promoters’ formal qualifications, artists and promoters are 
also matched based on informal qualifications (Jones 2002).  Just as in other project-
based industries, social and professional networks are important when assessing matches 
between concert promoters and artists.   Promoters and musicians often work repeatedly 
with tour managers, record labels, and other team members who are structurally 
embedded in their own professional networks (Passman 2000).   
Scholars have examined the process of matching artists to contractors according 
to alignment of formal qualifications (Pinheiro and Dowd 2009).  Further, studies have 
addressed the role of knowing-whom employment qualifications in the matching process 
(Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999).  However, scholars have yet to 
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pair equally qualified artists to examine the role of knowing-why competency signals in 
the matching of contractors to artists.  Such an investigation into the signals used by 
artists to display knowing-why employment qualifications will illuminate the role of 
adherence to professional norms, values and beliefs in explaining employment outcomes.   
Perhaps the relative lack of attention to variation in signals of knowing-why 
competencies is due to the fact that these informal qualifications are displayed in private 
and evaluated in a highly-concentrated network of industry insiders (Zafirau 2008; Uzzi 
1999).  The relative obscurity of knowing-why signals yields problematic response bias 
for researchers examining the role of informal qualifications in career outcomes.  
However, access to displays of knowing-why qualifications is not as difficult as it 
appears to be.  Legal scholars have argued that contracts are documents in which 
individuals signal values, beliefs, identities, and adherence to norms of conduct for 
contractors to interpret when making hiring decisions (Suchman 2003; Smith and King 
2009; Macaulay 1963).   
Contract riders—addenda to production agreements in which artists stipulate 
technical and personal requests—are especially useful in this regard, as they are a site for 
artists to signal competencies which are evaluated in the matching of artists and 
promoters.   As seen in Figure 1, the contract rider is an agreement between the artist and 
promoter.  By signing this contract, the promoter agrees to fulfill the requests of the rider 
and produce the concert to the artist’s specifications.   Thus, it is necessary that an artist 
be matched to a promoter who is capable of providing the necessary goods and services, 
or subcontracting with other agencies capable of fulfilling the demands of the rider.  A 
promoter’s ability to fulfill the demands of the contract rider is limited by the promoter’s 
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economic capacities (e.g., the cost of purchasing expensive hospitality items for the 
artist’s dressing room) and limitations of the subcontracted agencies (e.g., the structural 
constraints of a venue) (Kushner 2003).  The rider is a critical document for assessing the 
appropriateness of a match.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationships in the Production of a Concert Performance 
Compliance with the demands of a signed rider may appear unquestioned due to 
the fact that stipulations in the rider are legally a part of the agreement between the 
promoter and artist.  However, in practice, non-compliance is common (Passman 2000).  
Yet, legal action is unlikely unless non-compliance is related to failure to obtain 
appropriate insurance, licenses, permits, or in some way results in inadequate staging, 
sound, and other lighting requirements deemed critical to the safety of the performance 
(Waddell, Barnet, and Berry 2007:155).  Failures to provide hospitality services or 
nuanced specifications of the technical rider that are not critical to the safety of the artist 
and audiences are generally not treated with legal action, despite that fact that these 
specifications of the rider are also legally binding.   
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STATUS, POWER, AND LEGITIMACY IN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS 
Due to the fact that a rider is typically not enforced through legal means, an artist 
must find alternative methods to insure compliance with their demands (Waddell et al. 
2007).  One way compliance is achieved is by invoking directive power that is ascribed to 
the artist by virtue of a high status position.  An artist’s status position and the power 
associated with that position is validated through a process known as legitimation 
(Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006).  Legitimation of an artist’s status and power 
authority requires consensus among contracting parties about the validity of the artist’s 
position in the status hierarchy (Johnson et al. 2006; Zelditch 2001).  Consensus is 
achieved through justification—an argument which asserts that an artist without 
previously established legitimacy conforms to an existing set of norms, values or rules 
(Baumann 2007:49).   
Established artists come to negotiations with validated legitimacy as their elevated 
status positions has been justified by their formal qualifications and reputation passed 
through social networks (Baumann 2007).  By virtue of their legitimated status position, 
these artists command directive and influential power (Johnson et al. 2006).  Baumann 
(2007:55) argues resources for justification include both tangible and intangible resources 
such as money, knowledge, experience, network connections, physical assets, informal 
traditions, emotional energy, and leadership.  Emerging artists lack a number of these 
resources and are thus placed low in the status order in employment negations.  Their low 
status positions correspond to an absence of directive power (Johnson et al. 2006).  
However, directive power is a necessary pre-condition for making enforceable requests in 
a rider.  Therefore, emerging artists must work to achieve a higher status position in order 
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to obtain requisite power and authority.  Following Baumann’s (2007) resources for 
establishing legitimacy, I suggest that emerging artists can achieve an elevated status 
position is through the tradition of displaying adherence to professional norms, values, 
and beliefs.  I argue that this adherence is displayed through signals of artist’s knowing-
why qualifications in the contract rider.   
In this article I analyze variation in the strategies used by artists to justify their 
status and power authority through signals of knowing-why qualifications.  The purpose 
of this analysis is to illuminate the role of justification and legitimacy in project-based 
career employment.    
HYPOTHESES 
Through a content analysis of riders, I assess variation in strategies used to justify 
an artist’s knowing-why qualifications over time to determine if the variation in strategies 
reflects career stages for artists in different genres.  By virtue of their relative novelty, 
new organizations such as an emerging musical act are ranked lower in the status order 
and have minimal directive power in negotiations (Johnson et al. 2006).  Furthermore, 
research suggests that as an artist advances in their career contractors rely more heavily 
on information from social networks and expanding work histories when making hiring 
decisions due to the structural embeddedness of more established artists and the 
compounding effects of “knowing-how” and “knowing-whom” (Faulkner and Anderson 
1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999; Jones 2002, 2001).  Accordingly, I hypothesize artists 
must do more  work to signal alignment with professional norms to justify their power 
which is only minimally supported by the information presented through their weaker 
social networks and limited work histories.  Likewise, I hypothesize justifications of an 
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artist’s knowing-why qualifications in contract riders are used more sparingly by artists in 
advanced stages of their careers.  The null hypothesis is no patterned variation in the 
signaling strategies used by artists at different stages of their careers.  
 Scholars have argued that genre classifications are structured around a unique set 
of conventions for the production, distribution, and consumption of art (DiMaggio 1987; 
Lena and Peterson 2008; Baumann 2007).  In this article I use Lena and Peterson’s 
(2008:688) definition of music genres: “systems of orientations, expectations, and 
conventions that bind together an industry, performers, critics, and fans in making what 
they identify as a distinctive sort of music.”  Following their definition of genre, I 
hypothesize artists’ strategies for signaling knowing-why qualifications and the 
promoter’s expectations of such qualifications will be patterned by genre.  The null 
hypothesis is that variation in strategies for signaling knowing-why qualifications is not 
patterned according to musical genre.   
Research has often examined the role genre plays in the classification of culture 
for production and consumption (see for example DiMaggio 1987; Lena and Peterson 
2008; Baumann 2007; Hsu and Podolny 2005; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003).  
However, scholars have yet to address the role of genre in explaining artistic career 
outcomes.  The findings produced in this research are intended to generate hypotheses 
about the impact of genre on signals of an artist’s knowing-why employment 
qualifications in musician’s careers.    
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
The production riders used as data in this study were collected from national, 
regional, and local concert promoters and producers.  I made initial contact through email 
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or phone calls to concert promoters in my personal and professional social networks. 
Each promoter was asked to send riders from a variety of musical acts.  They were also 
asked to provide contact information for other promoters who might be willing to 
participate in the study.  The response rate was 100% for promoters who claimed access 
to a supply of riders.   
I obtained a total of 146 production riders from a range of musical acts, 
comedians, and politicians.   A single source, a large national concert promoter, provided 
a total of 97 riders.  The additional 49 riders were collected from six other firms, all of 
which were either local or regional promoters.  After excluding from my sample non-
musical artists, incomplete riders, and riders from artists working outside the four defined 
genres (to be discussed below), the effective sample size was 80 riders.  In this sample 
there is one rider for each artist for a tour date between 2007 and 2010.  The sample is 
constrained to touring commercial artists with available riders.  Thus, the sample is not 
generalizable to independent artists or those artists without production riders. 
Dependent variable: signaling strategies 
Using an inductive qualitative content coding strategy I coded each rider in my 
sample to identify strategies used to highlight and specify requests, an action understood 
as signaling the artist’s knowing-why qualifications. Due to the fact that unfilled 
demands in a rider are rarely legally prosecuted (Waddell et al. 2007), artists must find 
alternative methods to justify their directive power in an effort to insure compliance with 
the demands set forth in the rider.  Examples of such strategies include bolding items, 
attaching the phrase “very important” to a specific request, noting that a brand of bottled 
water was either an acceptable or unacceptable alternative to a specific backstage drink 
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request, and clauses specifying liability.   While these strategies have instructional 
purposes of directing attention to a specific request, they also are imbued with symbolic 
meanings as they signal an artist’s knowing-why informal qualifications to be assessed 
and validated by promoters in the negotiation exchange.  
Through an inductive and iterative coding process, I identified seven thematic 
strategies used by artists to signal knowing-why qualifications in their riders: 
“minimums,” “acceptable alternatives,” “unacceptable alternatives,” “linguistic 
emphasis,” “aesthetic emphasis,” “legal discourse,” and “deference.” Each signaling 
strategy is used as a dependent variable in a series of quantitative analyses of the 
strategies used by artists at various stages in their career.  Table 1 outlines the descriptive 
statistics for the strategies used to signal knowing-why qualifications as the dependent 
variables in my analyses. 
1. Minimum refers to any specification or addition to a clause written in such as 
manner as to note the request is a minimal requirement for the performance.  An 
example of this type of strategy comes from a stage two pop artist’s rider, “Stage 
size needs to be at least 30’ wide x 20’ deep.”  This type of strategy can be 
understood as an effort to deflect negative attention away from a request as 
potentially appearing frivolous.  This strategy is a signal of adherence to the 
professional norm of respecting the rider as a site to include only reasonable 
requests (Passman 2000). As seen in Table 1, this strategy is the only strategy 
used universally across all the riders in my sample.  On average this strategy 
comprises 17.65% of the signaling strategies used in a rider across all artists in the 
sample.  
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2. Acceptable Alternatives is one type of strategy used by artists to specify an 
appropriate alternative way of fulfilling a request.  An example of this strategy 
comes from a stage two R&B/blues artist: “One (1) Case (24) Stella Artois beer 
or local equivalent.”   Artists utilizing this strategy acknowledge that their 
requests are not always met to their exact standard, and suggest a substitute for a 
specific demand. The strategy signals that an artist understands the standards 
practices of producing concerts—non-compliance.  Acknowledgement of this 
professional norm signals a common framework for understanding the informal 
rules of the exchange between artists and promoters.  This strategy is the least 
commonly used strategy in riders, on average comprising only 5.55% of signaling 
strategies used by all artists in the sample.  
3. Unacceptable Alternatives is another type of strategy used by an artist when 
identifying alternative methods for fulfilling a request.  While this was rarely the 
most prevalent strategy used in a rider (mean usage= 8.7%), riders routinely had 
at least a few occurrences, such as this one found in a stage one rock artist’s rider: 
“Purchaser will provide and pay for a professional barricade (no dinner tables, 
bicycle racks, etc.).” Using this strategy an artist notes items that are unacceptable 
alternatives to a request, in this case tables or bicycle racks as a substitute to a 
professional grade barricade.  Similarly to the strategy of acceptable alternatives, 
this strategy signals an understanding of standard procedural operations.  
However, unlike noting acceptable alternatives, this strategy invokes an artist’s 
power to direct the operations of the promoter.   
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4. Linguistic Emphasis is a strategy used to draw attention to a stipulation in the 
rider through the use of any number of words to emphasize the importance of the 
request.  Such an example comes from a stage three rock artist: “It is imperative 
that all cold drinks and perishable foods be kept in/on ice at all times.”  In this 
example the artist emphasizes the importance of the temperature control on their 
beverages, noting that this request is “imperative.”  Other linguistic emphasis 
wording includes “necessary,” “mandatory,” and “important.”  These strategies 
signal an artist’s values by highlighting the importance of a particular demand for 
that artist. While linguistic emphasis signaling strategies are universally one of the 
most common strategies—with a mean usage of 15.92% of the strategies in the 
sample—it is never the only strategy used.  Artists regularly employ this tactic to 
draw attention and specify a variety of their demands in the rider, but do not rely 
solely on this type of strategy to insure the fulfillment of all requests in their rider.  
5. Aesthetic Emphasis includes all strategies that involve emphasizing or 
highlighting the importance of a demand through changes in font, such as 
underling or italicizing an item.  An example of this type of signal comes from a 
stage one rock artist: “ **ALL FOOD ORGANIC WHEN POSSIBLE** ”.  
The use of this strategy draws a reader’s visual attention to a specific request 
through aesthetic changes to the text.  The added visual attention to the request 
signals the value that an artist places on a specific request.  Like the linguistic 
emphasis strategy, almost every artist in the sample invoked this strategy at least 
once in their rider.  The mean usage of the aesthetic emphasis strategy is 31.77% 
of the strategies in the rider making it the most commonly used strategy across all 
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artists in the sample.  Signaling through aesthetic changes however, was never 
used as the only strategy used by artists to specify or highlight their demands.   
6. Deference refers to strategies that have a tone of respect or deference to the reader 
of the contract (i.e., the concert promoter).  An example comes from a stage one 
pop artist: “Also two medium sized face towels, black if possible, please.” In this 
example the use of the word “please” signals deference and respect to the concert 
promoter, potentially deflecting negative attention away from the specificity of 
the request.  Honorific deference is a mode in which status orders are validated 
(Johnson et al. 2006).  Accordingly, by displaying deference to the promoter an 
artist is validating their inferior status position.  I suggest that deference may also 
be a strategy used by artists to deflect resistance to the more commanding 
requests set forth in the rider.  Deference strategies comprise, on average, 12.95% 
of all the signaling strategies used in a rider. 
7. The Legal Discourse strategy indicates the inclusion of clauses to define liability 
and finically responsible parties.  Such an example of this use of legal discourse is 
found in the rider of a stage three, R&B/blues artist: “If Purchaser fails or refuses 
to make such a payment immediately, Purchaser shall be deemed in anticipatory 
breach of contract”.  This strategy demonstrates adherence to norms of the legal 
negotiation of contracts, and thus alignment with the norms of the profession as a 
business exchange.  Despite the fact that one might expect to find a prevalence of 
this type of strategy in contract riders, on average over 84% of the signaling 
strategies used to specify and highlight demands in a rider are not legal discourse. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Use of Signaling Strategies in Sample Riders 
Signaling Strategy Min. Usage Max Usage Mean Usage Median Usage 
Minimum 4.55% 80% 17.65% 14.20% 
Acceptable Alternative 0% 16.22% 5.62% 4% 
Unacceptable Alternative 0% 20% 8.08% 8.03% 
Linguistic Emphasis 0% 44.44% 15.92% 14.78% 
Aesthetic Emphasis 0% 85.33% 32.67% 33.53% 
Deference 0% 50% 12.95% 11.31% 
Legal Discourse 0% 53.06% 12.23% 8.98% 
 
Independent variable: career stage 
Scholars have used a variety of measures of artistic careers including album sales 
(Zwaan et al. 2009), Billboard chart rankings (Strobl and Tucker 2000), and awards 
(Pinheiro and Dowd 2009). However, for the purposes of this study, an artist’s album 
sales, chart positions, and critical acclaim may not accurately represent the touring aspect 
of their career.  This is due to the fact that an artist’s album sales, chart rankings, and 
awards do not necessarily correspond to tour revenue because concert promoters’ revenue 
comes from ticket sales, not album sales or Billboard chart success (Waddell et al. 2007).   
Furthermore, with the rise of illegal electronic downloads, album sales are dropping 
while tour revenues remain on the rise (Kusek and Leonhard 2009).  This suggests that 
concerts rather than album sales are becoming increasingly more valid measures of career 
success.  
I created a new measure of touring career success, average ticket price, by 
dividing an artist’s average ticket sales by their tour’s gross profits.  Data for this measure 
was collected from an online database, Pollstar—a trade publication that covers the 
concert industry and provides box office figures, artist itineraries, tour histories and 
contact information to touring industry professionals including promoters, booking 
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agents, artist managers, and venue owners/managers (Pollstar 2011).  Pollstar’s data is 
collected directly from artist agents, managers and promoters, who report sales figures 
and other logistics involving the production of the concert to the agency (Pollstar 2011).1  
I dropped artists from my sample that did not have ticket sales data available in Pollstar’s 
database.  The measure of average ticket price for each artist comes from 2009 tours, as 
at the time of data collection this was the only aggregated data available.  A limitation of 
using 2009 data for all artists is that the riders in my sample are for tours dates between 
2007 and 2010. Therefore, 2009 data is most applicable for the 2010 riders (as these 
riders will reflect changes directly applicable to their 2009 tours), and will be least 
applicable to 2007-2009 riders. 
Independent variable: musical genre 
In addition to the theoretical justifications I have for expecting variance by genre, 
preliminary analyses of the data showed variation in the average ticket price of a concert 
by genre. In my sample jazz and pop concerts cost, on average, more than rock and 
R&B/blues concerts.  To accurately assess variation in signaling strategies by an artist’s 
career stage I include genre in my second set of analyses.  To do so, I used data from the 
All Music Guide’s online database allmusic.com to categorize each artist into one of four 
genres: pop, rock, R&B/blues, and jazz (Allmusic 2011).  All Music is a bibliographic 
reference entertainment guide that provides artist profiles, discographies and chart 
rankings (Leach 2008).  Scholars have used data from All Music Guide and its companion 
website allmusic.com for measures of genre, networks, and career outcomes (Kusek and 
Leonhard 2009).  In this article, I produced the variable genre by collapsing several 
                                                
1 The self-reported aspect of this data is acknowledged as a limitation of the study.  However, Pollstar has a 
reputation of being a valid and reliable source of tour data within the industry despite the self-reported 
measures (Kusek and Leonhard 2009). 
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subgenres listed on allmusic.com into one genre.  For example, the pop genre includes: 
alternative pop/rock, pop, contemporary pop/rock, teen pop, dance pop, power pop, 
bubblegum, AM pop, sunshine pop, early pop/rock, and vocal pop.   
Measurement 
After compiling the information from Pollstar to calculate 2009 average ticket 
prices for each artist, I grouped artists according to genre and produced descriptive 
statistics for the distribution of ticket prices, provided in Table 2 below.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Career Stage Measure: Average Ticket Price by Genre 
Genre Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Pop $35.43 $85.35 $49.61 $17.24 $35.43-$85.35 
Rock $9.13 $78.43 $28.52 $14.68 $9.13-$78.43 
R&B/Blues $18.51 $99.49 $52.30 $22.50 $18.51-$99.49 
Jazz $27.27 $73.34 $52.20 $19.43 $27.27-$73.34 
 
From these descriptive statistics I identified the natural breaks in the distributions 
and used these breaks as boundaries for 3 distinct career stages (stage one-three).  I chose 
to use three distinct career stages to represent early, mid, and advanced career stage 
artists in order to insure at least one rider per cell.  For genres with normal distributions, I 
used quartiles as markers for the natural breaks.  The natural breaks in genres with 
skewed distributions were identified visually from graphical representations of average 
ticket prices within each genre and are reported in Table 3 below.  
Table 3: Average Ticket Prices by Genre and Career Stage  
Genre Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Pop $1-$40 $40.01-$50 $50.01+ 
Rock $1-$20 $20.01-$40 $40.01 
R&B/Blues $1-$40 $40.01-$60 $60.01+ 
Jazz 1-$30 40.01-$60 $60.01+ 
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Data analysis 
In an effort to account for sampling bias, I devised a stratified sample.  I created a 
3x4 table of riders by career stage and genre (see Table 4 below).  Cell counts range from 
one artist (jazz, stage one and jazz, stage three) to 23 artists (rock, stage two) with the 
majority of cells containing between two and seven artists. I used a random number 
generator to randomly select two riders from each cell in this table.  There were two 
exceptions: the first was within the genre of jazz as two artists were not available in each 
cell so I coded all four of the available contracts.  The second exception to my sampling 
strategy was within the genre of rock.  The rock genre comprised the largest portion of 
my sample.  Furthermore, the rock genre contained a number of different and relatively 
unique subgenres including heavy metal, alternative, and folk rock.  To account for the 
variation within the genre I oversampled rock riders using 30% of the riders in each cell. 
The stratified re-sampling of riders yielded a total of sample of 30 riders from four genres 
within three distinct career stages. 
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Table 4: Sampling Frame of Production Riders by Genre and Career Stage a  
 Stage #1 Stage #2 Stage #3 
Pop (2 each) 
 
Stage 1: 1-40 
Stage 2: 40.01-50 
Stage 3: 50.01+ 
(35.43)* 
(39.40)* 
(41.98)* 
(45.57)* 
(46.98) 
(65.44)* 
(85.35)* 
Rock (3-30%) 
 
Stage 1: 1-20 
Stage 2: 20.01-40 
Stage 3: 40.01+ 
(9.13)         (17.35) 
(10.40)       (17.73)* 
(10.43)       (18.00) 
(11.98)*     (18.13) 
(12.65)       (18.46)* 
(13.16)       (18.83) 
(16.01)       (18.77)* 
(16.11)       (19.17) 
(17.35)* 
(22.41)       (32.17) 
(24.03)       (32.79) 
(24.34)       (34.43) 
(24.41)*     (35.80)* 
(24.59)       (37.01) 
(25.94)       (38.06) 
(26.50)*     (38.27)* 
(26.66)       (39.58) 
(26.93)       (38.99)* 
(27.54)       (39.68) 
(27.86)*     (39.77) 
(28.72)* 
(48.42) 
(49.26) 
(52.01)* 
(52.13) 
(54.31) 
(55.53) 
(78.43)* 
R&B/Blues (2 each) 
 
Stage 1: 1-40 
Stage 2: 40.01-60 
Stage 3: 60.01+ 
(18.51)* 
(24.50)* 
 
(41.42)       (55.87) 
(50.74)*     (59.60) 
(50.82) 
(54.94)* 
 
(67.11)* 
(99.49)* 
Jazz (2 each) 
 
Stage 1: 1-40 
Stage 2: 40.01-60 
Stage 3: 60.01+ 
(27.27)* (48.75)* 
(59.43)* 
(73.34)* 
*An asterisk indicates the rider was randomly selected for inclusion in the final 
sample. Riders are anonymous, denoted instead by the tour’s average ticket price. 
  
The unit of analysis for my study is the production rider.  Each rider was coded 
using quantitative content analysis coding in Atlas.ti, version 6.  The rider was coded at 
the level of the sentence to account for multiple signaling strategies used in each of its 
sections.  Furthermore, some sections of the rider are often written as a series of bullet 
points as opposed to the more conventional prose of contract clauses.  The standard 
formatting practices of contract riders lends itself to sentence-level coding.  Utilizing a 
quantitative content analysis method, I coded each rider for the content of strategies used 
to justify a demand.  A total of 281 codes were applied to each of the riders.  Through my 
analyses I indentified 77 strategies which were subsequently collapsed into the seven 
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signaling strategies used as the dependent variables in my analyses.  After identifying the 
typology of signaling strategies, I conducted a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions to determine the relationship between career stage and the percent of each 
specification strategy used in an individual rider.  I conducted a post-hoc non-parametric 
test using Tukey’s honest significant difference (HSD) method to analyze pairwise 
comparisons of each of the three career stages.  For example, stage one musicians’ riders 
comprised of an average of 59 individual strategies, 24.46% of which were notations of 
minimum requirements.  I conducted Tukey’s HSD to test if this percentage was 
statistically different from stage three artists whose riders on average consisted of 99 
specifications, 15.71% of which were notations of minimum requirements.   A second 
OLS regression analysis was then conducted to assess variations in signaling strategy by 
both career stage and genre.  These analyses test the difference in percentage of 
specification strategies used per rider for artists by both career stage and musical genre.  
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sign test was run to test pairwise comparisons of the 
median use of signaling strategies by genre.  For example, jazz artists’ riders are 
comprised on average of 132 individual strategies, with an average median usage of the 
notation of minimum requirements of 11.24% of the strategies used per rider.  I 
performed a series of Wilcolxon-Rank-Sign analyses to test if this median percentage was 
statistically different from rock artists whose riders on average consisted of 83 signaling 
strategies, a median usage of minimum requirements comprising 19.98% of signaling 
strategies per rider.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for each of the sampling strategies by career stage are 
reported in Table 5 below.  The results demonstrate that each signaling strategy used in a 
rider is always coupled with another strategy—no one signaling strategy comprises more 
than 80% of the strategies used in each rider.  Furthermore, the diversity of signaling 
strategies used in a rider is patterned by career stage. Later career stage artists have a 
broader repertoire of signaling strategies used in a rider compared to their early career 
stage counterparts.  The maximum usage of one strategy by an advanced career stage 
artist is 53.06% of the strategies (the invocation of legal discourse by a stage three jazz 
artist).  The maximum use of a specification strategy for an early career stage artist is 
80% of the signaling strategies (notations of minimum requirements by a stage one rock 
artist).    Perhaps this is because until an artist achieves a high status position through 
economic success their ability to invoke directive power to specify and highlight 
demands is limited.  Accordingly, I suggest that early career stage artists must focus their 
specification efforts on fewer strategies.   
Artists across all career stages commonly focus their power to specify demands 
on making aesthetic changes to the font of the text used in the contract.  On average this 
type of specification strategy comprises almost one-third of the signaling strategies used 
in a rider.  The least commonly used strategy used by artists across all career stages is 
noting appropriate alternatives to a request.  On average less than 6% of the strategies 
used to specify and highlight a demand mention acceptable alternatives to a request.   
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Use of Signaling Strategy by Career Stage 
Signaling Strategy Min. Usage Max Usage Mean Usage Median Usage 
Minimum     
     Stage 1 7.27% 80% 24.46% 13.01% 
     Stage 2 4.55% 23.64% 13.46% 11.76% 
     Stage 3 9.52% 22.97% 15.71% 15.49% 
     Total 4.55% 80% 17.65% 14.20% 
Acceptable Alternatives     
     Stage 1 0% 16.22% 6.90% 5.46% 
     Stage 2 0% 14.81% 5.17% 4% 
     Stage 3 1.36% 12.5% 4.35% 3.59% 
     Total 0% 16.22% 5.55% 3.82% 
Unacceptable Alternatives     
     Stage 1 0% 20% 8.60% 10.22% 
     Stage 2 0% 17.9% 9.11% 9.82% 
     Stage 3 0.68% 17.57% 8.07% 6.3% 
     Total 0% 20% 8.70% 8.90% 
Linguistic Emphasis     
     Stage 1 0% 44.44% 11.60% 6.89% 
     Stage 2 0% 35.27% 19.23% 15.96% 
     Stage 3 7.48% 24.55% 15.96% 15.75% 
     Total 0% 44.44% 15.92% 14.78% 
Aesthetic Emphasis     
     Stage 1 0% 50.91% 29% 37.97% 
     Stage 2 13.82% 58.33% 34.64% 33.73% 
     Stage 3 18.31% 42.86% 30.39% 29.94% 
     Total 0% 85.33% 31.77% 33.53% 
Deference     
     Stage 1 4.84% 50% 19.33% 14.91% 
     Stage 2 0% 18.52% 10.14% 9.09% 
     Stage 3 0.68% 14.97% 9.05% 9.52% 
     Total 0% 50% 12.95% 11.31% 
Legal Discourse     
     Stage 1 0% 40% 10.71% 3.1% 
     Stage 2 0% 25.76% 12.71% 11.11% 
     Stage 3 4.69% 53.06% 19.27% 8.98% 
     Total 0% 53.06% 13.57% 10.45% 
  
Descriptive statistics are also reported for the usage of signaling strategies by 
genre in Table 6 below.  The results point to the rock genre as an interesting case. Riders 
from rock artists are the least diverse of all genres.  As demonstrated through the 
univariate analyses of career stage, the highest percentage use of an individual 
specification strategy is the notation of minimum requirements.  This comes from a stage 
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one rock artist’s rider.  The genre of jazz is the most diverse of all genres in the sample.  
Within jazz artists’ riders, no one strategy comprises more than 43% of the sampling 
strategies used per rider.   
 Consistent with the descriptive statistics for the use of signaling strategies by 
career stage, descriptives for the analysis of genre reveals that aesthetic changes are the 
most commonly used strategy among all artists in the sample.  Again, noting appropriate 
alternatives is the least commonly used strategy by artists across genres.   
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Use of Signaling Strategy by Genre 
Signaling Strategy Min. Usage Max Usage Mean Usage Median Usage 
Minimum     
     Jazz 4.55% 16.67% 10.92% 11.24% 
     Pop  6.06% 15.49% 10.66% 10.88% 
     R&B/Blues  7.98% 18.00% 10.66% 8.82% 
     Rock  8.33% 80.00% 25.56% 19.98% 
     Total 4.55% 80.00% 17.65% 14.20% 
Acceptable Alternatives     
     Jazz 0.00% 3.54% 2.22% 2.66% 
     Pop  0.00% 5.33% 2.97% 3.00% 
     R&B/Blues  1.36% 16.22% 5.57% 2.80% 
     Rock  0.00% 15.00% 7.61% 7.31% 
     Total 0.00% 16.22% 5.55% 3.82% 
Unacceptable Alternatives     
     Jazz 7.14% 14.71% 10.50% 10.07% 
     Pop  0.00% 10.91% 6.49% 7.29% 
     R&B/Blues  0.68% 14.00% 5.62% 4.28% 
     Rock  0.00% 20.00% 10.45% 11.52% 
     Total 0.00% 20.00% 8.70% 8.90% 
Linguistic Emphasis     
     Jazz 8.33% 22.06% 14.80% 14.40% 
     Pop  5.45% 44.44% 20.06% 17.74% 
     R&B/Blues  7.48% 24.55% 17.55% 17.44% 
     Rock  0.00% 35.27% 13.78% 13.79% 
     Total 0.00% 44.44% 15.92% 14.78% 
Aesthetic Emphasis     
     Jazz 15.20% 42.86% 33.68% 38.33% 
     Pop  18.31% 50.91% 35.51% 36.31% 
     R&B/Blues  16.22% 45.51% 30.58% 28.58% 
     Rock  0.00% 58.33% 30.13% 32.29% 
     Total 0.00% 58.33% 31.77% 33.53% 
Deference     
     Jazz 6.06% 20.24% 11.16% 9.17% 
     Pop  2.82% 20.00% 9.71% 8.87% 
     R&B/Blues  0.68% 16.43% 11.34% 12.59% 
     Rock  0.00% 50.00% 15.53% 12.03% 
     Total 0.00% 50.00% 12.95% 11.31% 
Legal Discourse     
     Jazz 4.76% 25.76% 16.44% 17.61% 
     Pop  0.00% 36.62% 13.91% 11.89% 
     R&B/Blues  2.00% 53.06% 17.27% 9.58% 
     Rock  0.00% 40.00% 11.02% 7.80% 
     Total 0.00% 53.06% 13.57% 10.45% 
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Model 1: OLS regression effects of career stage on use of signaling strategies 
Table 7 reports the coefficients form the OLS regression analysis of the use of 
signaling strategies by career stage.  Previous research has indicated that as artists 
progress in their careers they rely more heavily on extensive work histories and social 
networks to obtain employment (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999).  
I have hypothesized that this increased reliance on formal qualifications and informal 
qualifications presented through social networks reduces the need for justifying power 
through displays of knowing-why qualifications in the contract agreement. Results for the 
non-parametic post hoc test of Tukey’s HSD are also listed in the table.  In this first stage 
of my analyses I ran the regression analysis without controlling for genre.   
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Table 7: Rankings of Use of Signaling Strategy by Career Stage b 
Signaling Strategy Estimate Std. Error T-Value P-Value Tukey Group c 
Minimum      
     Intercept 24.460 4.596 5.322 1.28e-05*** A 
     Stage 2 -11.004 6.113 -1.800 0.083 . A 
     Stage 3 -8.751 7.162 -1.222 0.232 A 
N= 30            Adjusted r2= .046            F=1.7           df=(2,27)         p = 0.201 
Acceptable Alternative      
     Intercept 6.894 1.575 4.378 0.0002*** A 
     Stage 2 -1.723 2.095 -0.823 0.418 A 
     Stage 3 -2.541 2.454 -1.035 0.310 A 
N= 30            Adjusted r2= -0.03           F= .60          df=(2,27)         p = 0.554 
Unacceptable Alternative      
     Intercept 8.593 1.869 4.597 9e-05 *** A 
     Stage 2 0.522 2.487 0.210 0.835 A 
     Stage 3 -0.523 2.913 -0.180 0.859 A 
N= 30            Adjusted r2=  -.07            F=  .07        df=(2,27)         p = 0.930 
Linguistic Emphasis      
     Intercept 11.602 3.453 3.360 0.002 ** A 
     Stage 2 7.627 4.593 1.661 0.108 A 
     Stage 3 4.361 5.381 0.810 0.425 A 
N= 30            Adjusted r2= .03               F= 1.38       df=(2,27)         p = 0.269 
Aesthetic Emphasis      
     Intercept 28.999 4.633 6.259 1.07e-06*** A 
     Stage 2 5.645 6.163 0.916 0.368 A 
     Stage 3 1.387 7.220 0.192 0.849 A 
N= 30            Adjusted r2= -0.04           F=  .46         df=(2,27)         p = 0.636 
Deference      
     Intercept 19.326 3.020 6.399 7.44e-07***          B           C 
         (0.075)     (0.092)    
     Stage 2 -9.186 4.017 -2.287 0.030 * A      B  
          (0.075)                      
     Stage 3 -10.280 4.706 -2.184 0.038 * A                    C  
                       (0.092) 
N= 30            Adjusted r2=0.14              F=3.4          df=(2,27)         p = 0.049 * 
Legal Discourse      
     Intercept 10.705 4.280 2.501 0.019 * A                              
     Stage 2 2.003 5.693 0.352 0.728 A 
     Stage 3 8.566 6.670 1.284 0.210 A                              
N= 30            Adjusted r2=  -.0.01         F=  .87         df=(2,27)        p = 0.430 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’   
b One- way ANOVAs were conducted on the relationship between the use of signaling strategy and career stage.  
Resulting F scores and significance levels are given. 
c Groups with the same letter are not significantly different at the .10 level.  Those with different letters are 
significantly different at the .10 level.  P-values for significant differences are in parentheses under the Tukey 
Group letter.
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The results for the analysis of the deference strategy show that earlier career 
stage artists are more likely to use the specification strategy of deference than are later 
career stage artists (F=3.4, p<.05).  There is more than a 9% increase in the use of 
deference strategies between stage one (µ=19.3%) and stage two (µ=10.14%) artists (p-
value <.10).  Further, the difference in the mean usage of deferential language is more 
than 10% higher for stage one artists when compared to stage three artists (µ=9.05%).  
For example, 20.24% the signaling strategies in the stage 1 jazz group, Straight No 
Chaser’s rider is deferential discourse.  Within the first three sentences of the document, 
the rider includes a request that the promoter: “Please take the necessary time to fully 
ready (sic) this rider.”  Throughout their nine page rider deferential language is regularly 
used.  Such additional examples include mentions of preferred equipment, requests for 
hospitality items only if it is possible without inconveniencing the promoter, and 
additional pleases and thank you’s.  Advanced career stage artists in the sample are 
statistically less likely to include such a high percentage deferential signaling strategies in 
their riders.  When deference is used in these riders, it is typically only through the use of 
“please” and “thank you” language.   
Studies have shown that individuals with low status who do not have legitimated 
power authority face resistance from others if they come across as “too directive” in their 
attempts to invoke power authority by making demands (Eagly and Karau 2002).  Early 
career stage artists by virtue of their relative novelty in the industry are positioned low in 
the status order.  The results of my study show that these artists are most likely to use 
deferential language in making their requests.  Perhaps the high percentage use of 
deferential language in the riders of early career stage artists reflects an offensive position 
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taken by these individuals to reduce the likelihood of resistance for being “too directive” 
in their attempts to invoke authority when making demands in their riders.  Mid-stage and 
advanced career stage artists’ status positions and power authority is legitimated by their 
extensive work histories and well-connected social networks.  Therefore, the strategies 
through which they display legitimacy in a contract rider are more commanding (non-
deferential) without fear of being faced with resistance.   
In the regression output for Model1 a marginally significant relationship appears 
for the strategy of noting minimum requirements between stage one and stage two artists.  
However, due to the asymmetric distribution of the mean use of the minimum 
specification strategies across riders in my sample, non-parametric post-hoc tests were 
conducted to analyze the difference in the use of specification strategies by career stage.  
Results of the Tukey’s HSD analysis show no significant difference in the median usage 
of the minimum specification strategy between career stage one and career stage two 
artists.  Additionally, no significant difference was discovered for the use of minimum 
notations between career stage one and career stage artists artists, nor between career 
stage two and stage three artists.  I hypothesize that with an increased sample size, 
minimum requirements may prove to be significant in non-parametric post-hoc tests as 
the power of Tukey’s HSD test increases with sample size (Verzani 2004).  
There is no statistically significant difference in the mean use of the other five 
specification strategies: the notation of appropriate or inappropriate alternatives to a 
request, the invocation of legal discourse, or linguistic and aesthetic emphasis to the text.  
In the case of signaling the knowing-why qualification of adherence to profession norms 
through notations acceptable alternatives, the predicted mean use is between 4.4% and 
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6.9% for all artists in the sample.  The lack of statistical significance for the use of this 
strategy could again be due to my small sample size.  Noting acceptable alternatives is a 
strategy that is aligned with deference is that both strategies do not signal high levels of 
directive authority.  I hypothesize with an increased sample size statistical significance 
for the acceptable alternative category may be discovered.    
Noting unacceptable alternatives is one of the least commonly used strategy in 
riders.  Additionally, high p-values in the range of .80 suggest that this strategy is likely 
not patterned by career stage.  In contrast, linguistic and aesthetic emphasis strategies are 
extremely common in riders for artists across career stages.  The p-values for these 
strategies are lower: 0.108 for stage two artists and 0.425 for stage three artists.  The 
variable of linguistic emphasis was comprised of 14 different phrases that are used to 
stress the importance of a request.  The phrase “must have” is a commonly used strategy 
for stage two and stage three artists.  However, the use of this phrase appears 
qualitatively different among stage one career artists.  Perhaps by separating this phrase 
out from the 13 other phrases used to emphasize importance will reveal statistically 
significant patterns in the use of linguistic emphasis strategies by career stage.   
This lack of statistical significance in the differential use of the five strategies 
addressed above fails to support my hypothesis that as an artist advances in their career 
they are less likely to signal knowing-why qualifications using these tactics as they seek 
justification of their directive power.  Yet, the differential use of the strategy of deference 
by career stage reveals an acknowledgement of status orders and authority to invoke 
directive power which support the theories that guide my research.  
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Model 2: OLS regression effects of career stage and genre on use of signaling strategies 
 Next, I conducted a second OLS regression model including both career stage and 
genre.  Preliminary analyses of the data showed variation in average ticket prices by 
genre.  There is not an existing literature that tests the impact of genre on career 
outcomes.  The findings from the regression analysis are used to generate hypotheses 
about the effects of genre on career outcomes. The regression coefficients are reported in 
Table 8 below.   
 The results from Model 2 demonstrate no statistically significant difference in the 
main effects of career stage after genre is included in the model.  The use of deferential 
language remains the only specification strategy with patterned use by career stage. 
Controlling for genre, earlier career stage artists are still more likely to use deferential 
language when making their requests as compared to stage two and three artists             
(p-value > .05).  There is no patterned difference in the use of deferential language by 
genre.   
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Table 8: Rankings of Use of Signaling Strategy by Career Stage and Genre d 
Signaling Strategy  Estimate Std. Error T-Value P-Value N 
Minimum      
     Intercept 18.01 9.51 1.89 0.070 . 6 
     Career Stage -3.54 3.34 -1.06 0.300 30 
     Pop  -0.26 8.73 -0.03 0.976 6 
     R&B  -0.26 8.73 -0.03 0.976 6 
     Rock  13.88 7.70 1.80 0.083 . 12 
                          Adjusted r2=  0.17              F=    2.53          df=(4,25)           p = 0.066 
Acceptable Alternative      
     Intercept 4.13 3.27 1.26 0.219 6 
     Career Stage -0.96 1.15 -0.83 0.413 30 
     Pop  0.76 3.00 0.25 0.803 6 
     R&B  3.36 3.00 1.12 0.274 6 
     Rock  5.19 2.65 1.96 0.061 .  12 
                          Adjusted r2= 0 .10              F=    1.83          df=(4,25)           p = 0.154  
Unacceptable Alternative      
     Intercept 10.26 3.99 2.57 0.017 * 6 
     Career Stage 0.12 1.40 0.08 0.934 30 
     Pop  -4.01 3.67 -1.09 0.284 6 
     R&B  -4.88 3.67 -1.33 0.195 6 
     Rock  -0.02 3.23 -0.01 0.995 12 
                          Adjusted r2=  0.01              F=    2.53          df=(4,25)           p = 0.014 
Linguistic Emphasis      
     Intercept 10.26 8.05 1.28 0.214 6 
     Career Stage 2.27 2.83 0.80 0.431 30 
     Pop  5.26 7.39 0.71 0.483 6 
     R&B  2.75 7.39 0.37 0.713 6 
     Rock  -0.53 6.52 -0.81 0.936 12 
                          Adjusted r2=  -0.07             F=    0.52          df=(4,25)           p = 0.723 
Aesthetic Emphasis      
     Intercept 32.08 10.75 2.99 0.006 ** 6 
     Career Stage 0.80 3.78 0.21 0.834 30 
     Pop  1.83 9.86 0.19 0.854 6 
     R&B  -3.10 9.86 -0.31 0.756 6 
     Rock  -3.38 8.70 -0.39 0.701 12 
                          Adjusted r2=  -0.13             F=    0.17          df=(4,25)           p = 0.953 
Deference      
     Intercept 21.35 6.99 3.06 0.005 ** 6 
     Career Stage -5.10 2.46 -2.07 0.049 *    30 
     Pop  -1.46 6.41 -0.23 0.822 6 
     R&B  0.18 6.41 0.03 0.977 6 
     Rock  3.28 5.66 0.58 0.567 12 
                          Adjusted r2=  0.07              F=    1.54          df=(4,25)           p = 0.220 
Legal Discourse 
     Intercept  8.99 9.78 0.92 0.367 6 
     Career Stage 3.72 3.44 1.08 0.289 30 
     Pop  -2.52 8.97 -0.28 0.781 6 
     R&B  0.83 8.97 0.09 0.927 6 
     Rock  -4.61 7.92 -0.58 0.565 12 
                         Adjusted r2= -0.06             F=    0.56          df=(4,25)          p = 0.694 
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 However, after the inclusion of genre in the second model, genre effects appeared 
for two specification strategies: the strategy of noting minimum requirements and the 
strategy of specifying acceptable alternatives.  To test pairwise comparisons of each of 
the four genres, I conducted a series of non-parametic T-tests using the Wilcoxon Rank-
Sign test to analyze the difference in the median usage of each of the seven specification 
strategies.  Results of these analyses are produced in Table 9 below.   
Rock artists are statistically more likely to include a higher percentage of 
minimum requests than musicians from each of the three other genres when controlling 
for career stage (p-value > .05).  The predicted percentage of the use of minimums in a 
rock artist’s rider is 31.89% compared to 18% for jazz musicians, and 17.74% for both 
pop and R&B/blues musicians.   To illustrate this difference I now provide examples 
from two of the riders in my sample. Lyle Lovett’s (a stage three rock musician) 
production rider includes each of the seven signaling strategies.  However, 33.33% of the 
signaling strategies used are notations of minimum requirements.  This is compared to 
only 9.52% of the strategies used in Al Green’s rider (a stage three R&B/Blues 
musician). Lovett’s rider contains multiple instances of requests for “adequate security” 
and a dressing room to accommodate “at least 35 people.”  Green’s rider, while also 
noting minimum production requirements focuses the majority of the attention of the 
rider’s signaling strategies on invoking legal authority (mean usage= 53.06%) primarily 
to specify financial responsibility for supplying personnel and dressing room 
accommodations.   
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Table 9:  Tests of Equal Medians of Usage of Signaling Strategy by Genre e 
Signaling Strategy Test Statistic p-value 
Minimum   
     Jazz—Pop  13 0.914 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  13 0.914 
     Jazz—Rock  7.5 0.033 * 
     Pop—R &B/Blues 19 0.937 
     Pop—Rock  9 0.005 ** 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   8 0.003 ** 
Acceptable Alternatives   
     Jazz—Pop  9.5 0.669 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  9 0.610 
     Jazz—Rock  8 0.038 * 
     Pop—R&B/Blues 18 1 
     Pop—Rock  19 0.063 . 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   31 0.386 
Unacceptable Alternatives   
     Jazz—Pop  17.5 0.285 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  20 0.114 
     Jazz—Rock  26 0.873 
     Pop—R &B/Blues 21 0.699 
     Pop—Rock  25 0.173 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   25 0.173 
Linguistic Emphasis   
     Jazz—Pop  10 0.762 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  9 0.610 
     Jazz—Rock  30 0.872 
     Pop—R &B/Blues 17 0.937 
     Pop—Rock  55 0.299 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   54 0.339 
Aesthetic Emphasis   
     Jazz—Pop  12 1 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  12 1 
     Jazz—Rock  34 0.559 
     Pop—R &B/Blues 23 0.485 
     Pop—Rock  50 0.536 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   39 0.837 
Deference   
     Jazz—Pop  15 0.610 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  9 0.610 
     Jazz—Rock  24 0.721 
     Pop—R &B/Blues 14 0.589 
     Pop—Rock  31 0.397 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   41 0.968 
Legal Discourse   
     Jazz—Pop  15 0.593 
     Jazz—R&B/Blues  14 0.762 
     Jazz—Rock  40 0.221 
     Pop—R &B/Blues 15 0.6884 
     Pop—Rock  46 0.771 
     R&B/Blues—Rock   47 0.710 
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’   
e Wilcoxon Rank-Sign tests were conducted to compare median usage of signaling strategies by genre.  Resulting T-
statistic and p-values are given 
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Additionally, rock musicians are also statistically more likely to have a higher 
percentage use of noting acceptable alternatives as compared to jazz musicians (p-value> 
.05).  The predicted percentage of the use of noting acceptable alternatives is 9.32% for 
rock artists compared to 4.13% for jazz musicians.  Furthermore, rock artists are 
marginally more likely to have a higher percentage use of noting acceptable alternatives 
as compared to pop musicians after controlling for career stage (p-value >.10).  The 
predicted percentage use of noting acceptable alternatives is 4.89% for pop musicians 
compared to 9.32% for rock musicians.  
The early career stage rock group Five Finger Death Punch’s rider is comprised of 
40 signals of knowing-why qualifications to justify status and power authority.  15% of 
these signals are notations of acceptable alternatives to their requests.  The stage one jazz 
group Straight No Chaser’s rider is comprised of 84 individual signaling strategies, none 
of which are notations of acceptable alternatives.  Additionally, the stage one pop artist 
Adam Lambert’s rider lists only 18 signals of knowing-why qualifications, 7.27% of 
these are mentions of acceptable alternatives.  This difference in the use of signaling 
adherence to the professional norm of respecting the rider as a site to include only 
reasonable requests (Passman 2000) suggests that rock artists are potentially often 
perceived to break the norm as compared to jazz and pop artists.  The findings suggest 
that perhaps rock artists must perform more symbolic work to buffer against a negative 
stereotype and display adherence to norms of the profession. 
The specification strategies of noting minimal requirements and suggesting 
acceptable alternatives to a request have one commonality: foreshadowing and working 
to buffer against non-compliance by positing their demands as austere and flexible.  The 
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specification of a minimum request demonstrates to promoters that the artist is being 
conservative in their demands.  Noting acceptable alternatives also demonstrates 
flexibility and understanding on behalf of the artist.  I suggest that rock artists are more 
likely to use strategies to present their demands as austere and flexible to buffer against a 
social stigma of rock artists as frivolous, eccentric performers.   
There is no statistically significant difference in the mean use of the other five 
specification strategies by genre: the notation of inappropriate alternatives to a request, 
the invocation of legal discourse, deferential language, or linguistic and aesthetic 
emphasis to the text.  I hypothesize significance was not discovered in these remaining 
five specification strategies because of the small sample size of riders in jazz, pop, and 
R&B/blues genres.  I suggest that the small sample sizes drastically reduced the power of 
my tests to assess variation by genre.  Additionally, the results of my analyses show 
potential interaction effects between genre and career stage with respect to cases of 
deferential language.   Limitations of my sample size prevent me from testing these 
apparent interaction effects as well as reduce the power of my regression analyses.  I 
suspect that analyses including a larger sample of a more diverse group of artistic genres 
will reveal significant results in the categories of minimum notations, acceptable 
alternatives, deference, and linguistic discourse in line with the patterns that appear in the 
analyses of both career stage and genre variation.   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has explored how artists signal informal qualifications of knowing-
why in an effort to justify power and status in the negotiation of employment contracts.   
The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between an artist’s career stage, 
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musical genre, and use of strategies to signal adherence to norms, values, and beliefs of 
the concert production industry.  In this article I have demonstrated how the display of 
knowing-why career qualifications are patterned by career stage with a focus on 
explaining how early career stage artists who have limited validations of their status and 
power authority signal their knowing-why qualifications to justify their power to make 
specific demands in their contract rider.   
The concert touring industry has two main characteristics—also found in other 
project-based industries—that make the display of informal knowing-why qualifications 
an ever-present need for those seeking employment.  First, as discussed above, creative 
industries are built around social networks.  Studies have demonstrated how workers in 
industries that are built on closely linked social networks rely on reputation passed 
through these networks to obtain employment.  This is true in many fields including 
service work, low skilled and low paid manufacturing positions, independent contractors, 
managerial positions, and freelance entrepreneurs (Smith 1997; Zafirau 2008; Osnowitz 
2006; Kunda, Barley, and Evans 2002).  Artists have an awareness of the importance of 
building and maintaining a good reputation with social networks, and they work to 
portray themselves as adhering to professional norms, values and belief structures in 
order to develop a good reputation with concert promoters who may employ them in the 
future, or pass information about them along to other promoters.   
Second, creative industries are fraught with uncertainty wherein there are no 
formal characteristics for measuring an artist’s potential for economic or critical success.  
Given the rapid pace of changing consumer demands, creative industries must deal with a 
high degree of uncertainty in the hiring process (Bielby and Bielby 1994, 1999).  The 
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uncertainty of success leads contractors to rely on informal qualifications of an artist’s 
character and attitudes as proxy measures of a candidate’s fit with the project (Jones 
2002; Zafirau 2008; Bielby and Bielby 1994, 1999).  In this respect, the concert industry 
has commonalities with other project-based labor markets in the postindustrial economy 
wherein the absence of formal criteria for evaluating workers reflects the utility informal 
qualifications to fill the void (Scott 1987).   
The case of artist contract riders suggests the process of justifying power authority 
varies in form and content based an artist’s validated formal and informal qualifications.  
Early career stage artists who have little external validation in the form of work histories 
and social networks present their informal qualifications of knowing-why qualifications 
by demonstrating deference to potential contractors.  Early career stage artists have 
several characteristics commonalities to other inexperienced workers seeking 
employment in project based industries.  The need for artists to display deference to 
promoters can be generalized to the experience of a recent college graduate seeking first-
time employment in project-based sectors.  Similar to an early career stage artist, these 
recent graduates have a skill set, but little to no work experience, awards, to validate their 
skill set as desirable to employers.  Furthermore, recent college graduates by virtue of 
their inexperience in the workforce have limited professional networks to leverage for 
recommendations and referrals in a project-based employment sector.  Therefore, the 
findings presented in this article demonstrating the increased use of deferential language 
used by artists in their contract riders may be generalizable to the study of recent 
graduates’ resumes.  In illustrating their qualifications for employment in resumes and 
job applications graduates assert power through claims of their qualifications.  However, 
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with little work experience and networks to legitimate their qualifications, these workers 
also must rely on their knowing-why qualifications to obtain employment (Defillippi and 
Arthur 1994).  Future research ought to analyze the generalizability of my findings to an 
empirical investigation of recent-graduate’s resumes.  If these studies found similarities 
in the patterned usage of signaling strategies by career stage, these theories may begin to 
explain how knowing-why qualifications also contribute to labor market segmentation in 
project-based employment sectors.   
The results of my analyses show interesting variation in the use of the strategies: 
noting minimum requirements and acceptable alternatives by musical genre.  Rock artists 
are more likely than other artists in the sample to use these techniques to signal 
professionalism—a component of their knowing-why career qualifications.  I suggest that 
this is the case because rock artists face the task of deflecting the negative perceptions of 
their professional behavior that accompany the negative stereotypes of musicians in this 
genre in the music industry (Passman 2000).  I suggest that these findings may translate 
to an understanding of the ways in which women, minorities, and other workers whose 
perceived competency is tainted by negative stereotypes.  In alignment with this model 
for explaining the process of justification of power authority, scholars have argued that 
stereotypical beliefs about characteristics including gender, sexuality and ethnicity have 
pervasive effects on the individual’s ability to obtain influence, power, and respect 
among other actors (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Carli 1991; Feagin 1991; Webster and Foschi 
1988).  I suggest that these social actors utilize the same strategies as early career stage 
artists to deflect negative attention away from the stereotypical categorizations of their 
work and help them obtain status and power authorities.  Future research ought to apply 
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these hypotheses to cases such as gender, sexuality, and racial discrimination in 
employment to verify my findings applicability to work outside the concert industry.  
The sample used in this analysis has a number of notable limitations including the 
small sizes’s impact on the power of statistical tests and the fact that my sample is not 
constructed systematically from a population index.  I suggest that increased levels of 
significance in the differential use of signaling strategies by career stage and genre may 
be found when utilizing a larger sample of riders from a diverse set of musical genres due 
to the fact that statistical power increases with increased sample sizes (Agresti and Finlay 
2008).   
Due to the fact that I do not have access to a comprehensive database of 
musicians’ riders my results cannot be generalized to all touring musicians.  Instead, my 
sample and the generalizabiliy of my findings are limited to commercial artists with 
formal contract riders.  If a population level database of riders existed I would be able to 
systematically stratify my sample to include appropriate proportions of riders from artists 
across career stages and genres.  This sampling strategy would also allow me to test for 
interaction effects as well as increase the statistical power of my models.  Despite the fact 
that a population level database of riders does not exist, my sample is comprised of riders 
obtained from each of the three types of promoters: local, regional, and national.  
Therefore, I am confident that the effect of the promoter’s capacities has been adequately 
accounted for, leaving only variation in artists’ capacities to be evaluated in the analysis 
of signaling strategies.  Additionally, the findings of this research are consistent with 
theories of status and the legitimation process: those without legitimated power must seek 
to obtain that power through a variety of measures including addressing informal 
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traditions of the profession (Baumann 2007).  Therefore, I am confident with my 
sample’s ability to accurately identify the main effects of career stage on the use of 
signaling strategies in addition to my ability to generate testable hypotheses about the 
effects of genre.   
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